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THE SECOND FRONT: FREE EXPRESSION VERSUS
INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY
GEORGE D. HAIMBAUGH, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
The Second Front in the campaign to establish federal power to
mediate between constitutional claims to free speech and state regu-
lation favoring other social and individual interests was opened with
the case of New York Times v. Sullivan1 in March 1964 when the
United States Supreme Court reversed a Montgomery, Alabama, police
commissioner's five hundred thousand dollar libel judgment against the
newspaper and a group of civil rights leaders.
The First Front had opened almost forty years before when the
Supreme Court undertook to decide in Gitlow v. New York2 whether
the exercise by a state of its police power to prevent "criminal anarchy"
deprived a defendant of "his liberty of expression in violation of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 3 Since then under
the banner of the First Amendment and employing such tactical doc-
trines as Tendency to Evil,4 Clear and Present Danger,5 and Balancing
* Associate Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law; A.B., DePauw
Universirv; J.D., Northwestern Universit,; J.S.D., Yale University.
1. 376 U.S. 255 (1964).
2. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
3. Id. at 644. The Court upheld a conviction, under a New York Criminal Anarchy
statute, of the publisher of "The Left Wing Manifesto" and "The Revolutionary Age."
4. Speaking for the majority of the Court in Gitlow, Mr. Justice Sanford stated:
"In such cases it has been held that the general provisions of the statute may be
constitutionally applied to the specific utterance of the defendant if its natural tendency
and probable effect was to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body
might prevent. Schenck v. United States, supra. [249 U.S. 47], p. 51; Debs v. United
States, supra [249 U.S. 2111, pp. 215, 126. And the general statement in the Schenck
case (p. 52) that the 'question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils,'-upon which great reliance is placed
in the defendant's argument-was manifestly intended, as shown by the context, to
apply only in cases of this class, and has no application to those like the present,
where the legislative body itself has previously determined the danger of substantive
evil arising from utterances of a specified character." id. at 671.
5. The clear and present danger test as formulated by Mr. Justice Holmes in
Schenck is quoted in note 4 supra. Dean McKay has written, "Only during the four-
teen years from 1937 [Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 260 (1937)] to 1951 can it be
said that the danger test had any real impact, and even then its limited success was
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of Interest-preferred and common-the Supreme Court has brought
under federal suzerainty broad areas of state law respecting public
security,7 order' and morality
It became clear that the Court was opening a new front when it
stated the reasons for its reversal in Times. Although it had found
that the evidence in that case "was incapable of supporting the jury's
finding"0 that the allegedly libelous statements were made 'of and con-
cerning'" 1 Sullivan, the Court passed up the opportunity to base its de-
cision on this or on possibly available procedural grounds.' 2 Instead, it
dependent as often as not on the barest majority made up of differing members of
the Court who agreed to the use of the test, one may suspect, for varied reasons.
McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.UJ.REv. 1183, 1207 (1959). A subsequent
decision, Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962), indicates that the clear and present
danger test continues to be the standard applied by the Court in contempt by publi-
cation cases. Comparing the bad tendency and clear and present danger test, Professor
Emerson points out that, in theory, the danger test "protects some expression even
though that expression interferes with the attainment of other social objectives. In
practice, by drawing the line of allowable expression closer to the point of action,
it opened up a wider area of protection" Emerson, Taward a General Theory of
the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877. 910 (1963). See Dennis v. U.S., 351 U.S. 494,
510 (1961).
6. See Kalven, The New York Tines Case; A Note on "The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment" 1964 S.CT.REv. 191, 214-217.
7. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); and Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359 (1931).
8. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); and Adderley v. Florida,
385 U.S. 39 (1966).
9. See, e.g., Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); and A Book Named "John
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413 (1966).
10. In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the Supreme Court of Alabama
approved the trial court's ruling that the jury could find the statements to have been
made "of and concerning" the respondent, state: "We think it common knowledge that
the average person knows that municipal agents, such as police and firemen, and others,
are under the control and direction of the city governing body, and more particularly
under the direction and control of a single commissioner. In measuring the performance
or deficiencies of such groups, praise or criticism is usually attached to the official in
complete control of the body." 376 U.S. at 263.
11. 376 U.S. at 288.
12. See, S. Pierce, The Anatomy of An Historic Decision: New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 43 N.C. L. REv. 315, 348-352 (1965). Judge Pierce, who was a counsel for
the individual petitioners in the Times case, believes the petitioners were also entitled
to a reversal because of a lack of due process. He describes the atmosphere in the
segregated trial court room, and notes a practice of excluding of Negroes from the
jury panel, the lack of evidence of special damages and the size of the verdict. Compare
with statement of Judge Hutchenson in his opinion in Crowell Collier Pub. Co. v.
Caldwell, 170 F. 2d 941 (1949): "Carried away by the sense of unfolding drama pre-
1967]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [
created on behalf of the defendants a novel constitutional privilege
which Mr. Justice Brennan stated as follows:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule
that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a de-
famatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves
that the statement was made with "actual malice"-that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not.'3
This article is concerned with the emergence, constitutional justifi-
cation and scope of this new privilege which, as adapted, is serving as
the workhorse or jeep of the Supreme Court's offensive in the Second
Front area of state protection of individual dignity.
EMERGENCE OF THE Times PRIVILEGE
The emotional overtones attending the New York Times case are
evoked by descriptions of an atmosphere in which Alabama without
distorting its libel law "somehow pounced on this opportunity to
punish" 14 an outside newspaper, and in which the United States Supreme
Court manifested an anxiety to reach the substantive issues.' 5 The
actual circumstances from which the Times privilege was developed
is suggested by the following passages from the opinion of the Court
concerning the defendants' offending words, acts and omissions.
The third paragraph and part of the sixth paragraph from the ad-
vertisement published in the New York Times and signed by the Com-
mittee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in
the South:
In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang 'My Country,
Tis of Thee' on the State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled
sented by the spectacle of a sectional row, a struggle of North against South, Florida
against New York, David against Goliath, Ivanhoe against the Templar, litigants,
witnesses, lawyers, and jury seemed to regard the contest as a sporting event, a wager
by battle, in which the best battler ought to win. For other statements concerning
possible alternative grounds for reversal and remand, see A. Berney, Libel and the First
Anendrnent-A New Constitutional Privilege. 51 VA. L. Rav. 1, 29 & n. 99 (1965), and
n. 4 in Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion in Times, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
13. 376 at 279-80.
14. Kalven, supra note 6, at 200.
15. Pierce, supra note 12, at 363.
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from school, and truckloads of police armed with shotguns and
tear-gas ringed the Alabama State College Campus. When the
entire student body protested to state authorities by refusing to
re-register, their dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve
them into submission.
Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr. King's
peaceful protests with intimidation and violence. They have
bombed his home almost killing his wife and child. They have
assaulted his person. They have arrested him seven times ... 16
Part of the comment of the Court on the contents of the advertise-
ment:
It is uncontroverted that some of the statements contained in
the two paragraphs were not accurate descriptions of events which
occurred... The campus dining hall was not padlocked on any
occasion, and the only students who may have been barred from
eating there were the few who had neither signed a preregistration
application nor requested temporary meal tickets. Although the
police were deployed near the campus in large numbers on three
occasions, they did not at any time "ring" the campus and they
were not called to the campus in connection with demonstrations
on the State Capitol steps, as the third paragraph implied. Dr.
King had not been arrested seven times, but only four...17
Proof presented by the plaintiff-respondent to show actual malice
included "a statement by the Times' Secretary that, apart from the pad-
locking allegation, he thought the advertisement was 'substantially cor-
rect,' . . . the Times' failure to retract upon respondent's demand, al-
though it later retracted upon the demand of Governor Patterson, ....
[and] evidence that the Times published the advertisement without
checking its accuracy against the news stories in the Times' own files." Is
In making its reversal in Times depend on a holding that the inac-
curacies in the advertisement were irrelevant and on a determination
that the evidence of the defendants' conduct did not support a finding
16. 376 U.S. at 257-58.
17. Id. at 258-259. The opinion also stated, "Three of Dr. King's four arrests took
place before respondent became Commissioner. . . respondent had nothing to do with
procuring the indictment [following that arrest]". Id. at 259.
18.-Id. at 286-287. 'Each of the individual petitioners testified that he had not
authorized the use of his name, and that he had been unaware of its use until receipt
of respondent's demand for a retraction." Id. at 260.
1967]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
of actual malice, the Court forged a new constitutional rule. Before
the Times decision in a typical libel law jurisdiction such as Alabama,
in an action brought by a public official who had been defamed by a
critic of his official conduct, the critic could not defend himself unless
he proved the truth of the statement complained of. But applying the
rule in Times in Alabama-and all other states-the plaintiff in such a
case cannot now prevail unless he proves actual malice on the part his
detractor. As the three concurring justices-Black, Douglas and Gold-
berg-would have had it, the plaintiff in such a case could not prevail
at all.
Directing attention beyond the immediate factual context of the case,
The Supreme Court described the background against which the
Times privilege emerged as one of "a profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public of-
ficials." 19
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTIFICATION
In the only previous case 20 that did present the question of con-
stitutional limitations upon the power to award damages for libel
of a public official, the Court was equally divided and the ques-
tion was not decided. . .In deciding the question now, we are
compelled by neither precedent nor policy to give any more
weight to the epithet "libel" than we have to other "mere labels"
of state law.21
So wrote Mr. Justice Brennan in his opinion for the majority of the
Court in the New York Times case. Dr. Meiklejohn has pointed out
that when the Supreme Court "introduces a new concept in constitu-
tional interpretation, the Court takes pains to show continuity with
19. Id. at 270.
20. Schenectady Union Publishing Co. v. Sweeney, 316 U.S. 642 (1942). The Court
affirmed, per curiam, a judgment (122 F.2d 288) which reversed an order granting
defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that no cause of action had been pleaded.
This libel action was brought by a congressman who complained of a story in Pearson
and Allen's syndicated column, "Washington Merry-Go-Round," charging him with
anti-Semitism in opposing a judicial appointment. For description of this and other
cases based on the same column, see D. Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and
Candidates, 49 CoLUM. L. REv. 875, 882-84 (1949).
21. 376 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1964).
[Vol. 9:126
FREE EXPRESSION VERSUS INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY
precedent." ,22 This the Court sought to do in Times indirectly by means
of general propositions from and analogies to earlier cases.
General Propositions
The Supreme Court discounted statements from its opinions in earlier
cases which were cited by the plaintiff in Times to the effect that libel
is not protected by the Constitution explaining that none of those
cases "sustained the use of libel laws to impose sanctions upon expression
critical of the official conduct of public officials." 23 But the Court did
not hesitate to draw upon other cases none of which involved the law
of libel. Both sides, in fact, cited cases which were far from irrelevant.
The cases from which passages quoted by the plaintiff were in effect
distinguished away, concerned state power to investigate bar2 3" appli-
cants, to censor motion pictures,24 to prosecute for obscenity,25 for
group libel,26 and for "fighting" words,27 and to provide for the abate-
ment of libelous periodicals as public nuisances.2 The last of these cases
was Near v. Minnesota29 in which the publisher of a newspaper had
made charges of illicit relations with gangsters against the mayor and
chief of police of Minneapolis and the county attorney and grand jury
of Hennepin County. Although the Court disallowed relief under the
nuisance statute because of the "prior restraint" involved, it had at the
same time, apprised the plaintiffs that "the common law rules that sub-
ject the libeler to responsibility for the public offense, as well as for the
private injury, are not abolished by the protection extended in our
constitutions." 10 In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the case of the
"fighting" words, the Jehovah's Witness whose conviction had been
sustained had addressed the following words to a city marshal near the
entrance to city hall: "You are a God damned racketeer [and] a
22. D. Meiklejohn, Public Speech and the First Amendment, 55 GEo. L. J. 234, 236
(1966). The author added, "Acceptance of novelty, as in Brown v. Board of Educ., is
comparatively rare." Ibid.
23. 376 U.S. 719.
23a. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 & n.10 (1957).
24. Times Film Corporation v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 48 (1961).
25. Roth v. United States (Alberts v. California), 354 U.S. 476, 486-487 (1957).
26. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
27. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
28. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
29. Id. at 697.
30. Id. at 715.
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damned Fascist and the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or
agents of Fascists." 31
To establish continuity with precedent while "writing on a clean
slate," 32 the Court offered a selection of quotations from its prior
opinions. From cases dealing with state law prohibiting the publica-
tion of obscenity, 3 display of the red flag,34 contempt of court by pub-
lication, 35 solicitation of legal business,3 6 and advocacy of criminal syn-
dicalism,37 the Court quotes statements stressing the necessity for op-
portunities for "unfettered interchange of ideas," "free political discus-
sion," speaking "one's mind-although not always with perfect good
taste, on all public institutions," "vigorous advocacy," and the free dis-
cussion of "supposed grievances and proposed remedies." These the
Court boils down to the "general proposition that freedom of expression
upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment has long
been settled by our decisions." 38
Analogies
In its New York Times decision the Court acted to increase the op-
portunities for such expression by changing traditional libel law pre-
sumptions of falsity and malice to favor the defendants. Support for
these shifts in the burden of proving those two elements of libel is
offered by way of analogy with earlier cases the most apposite of which
are Barn v. Matteo3", and the contempt by publication cases in the line
which began with Bridges v. California.40 "If judges are to be treated
31. 315 U.S. at 569. The Court stated that "The refusal of the state court to admit
evidence of provocation and evidence bearing on the truth or falsity of the utterances,
is open to no Constitutional objection." Id. at 574.
32. 376 U.S. at 268-269 (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg).
33. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 784 (1957).
:34. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
35. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941).
36. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963).
37. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-376 (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Brandeis). Also quoted was the well-known statement by Judge Learned Hand (in an
anti trust case) that the First Amendment "presupposes that right conclusions are more
likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authori-
tative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon
it our all." United States v. Associated Press, 52 F.Supp. 362, 372 (1943).
38. 376 U.S. at 269.
39. 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959).
40. 314 U.S. 252 (1941). For surveys of the development of this analogous line of
cases, see E. Hudson, Freedom of the Press versus Fair Trial: The Remedy Lies ,with
the Courts, 1 VALPARAISO U. L. Rav. 8, 14-18 (1966) and G. Haimbaugh, Free Press
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as men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate," the Court reasoned
in Bridges, "surely the same must be true of other government officials,
such as elected city commissioners." 41 Referring to the Matteo case,
the Court argued that "It would give public servants an unjustified
preference over the public they serve, if critics of official conduct did
not have a fair equivalent of the immunity granted to the officials them-
selves." 42 Comparing the Times case with Smith v. California43 the
Court added, "A defense for erroneous statements honestly made is no
less essential here than was the requirement of proof of guilty knowledge
which... we held indispensable to a valid conviction of a bookseller for
possessing obscene writings for sale." 44 And looking back to Speiser v.
Randall,45 a form of loyalty-oath case, the Court said, "Authoritative
interpretations of the First Amendment guarantees have consistently
refused to recognize an exception for any test of truth... and especially
not one that puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker." 146
Justices Black and Douglas, the two members of the present Supreme
Court who heard the case of Beauharnais v. Illinois7 in 1952, believe that
there is a strong similarity between that case and the cases in which
the Times rule has been applied.18 In the earlier case the president of the
White Circle League was convicted under an Illinois statute 49 for cir-
culating a leaflet which petitioned the Mayor and City Council of
Chicago to "preserve and protect white neighborhoods" against the
"infiltrations" and "aggressions" of Negroes.50 Where a bare majority of
versus Fair Trial: The Contribution of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 26 U. Prrr. L. REv. 491,.
497-508 (1965).
41. 376 U.S. at 273.
42. 376 U.S. at 282-283. "In Barr v. Matteo . .. this Court held the utterance of a!
federal official to be absolutely privileged if made "within the outer perimeter" of his;
duties. The States accord the same immunity to statements of their highest officers, al-.
though some differentiate their lesser officials and qualify the privilege they enjoy."'
Id. at 282.
43. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
44. 376 at 278. The Court's opinion in Smith as in Times was written by Mr. Jrstibe
Brennan.
45. 357 U.S. 513, 525-526 (1958).
46. 376 U.S. at 271.
47. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
48. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 79-80, 82 (1964) (dissenting opinions of
Justices Black and Douglas). Douglas in an opinion in which Black joined stated that
Beauharnais "should be overruled as a misfit in our constitutional system and as out
,of line with the dictates of the First Amendment." Id. at 82.
49. IM. Rev. Stat. c. 38, § 471, (1949).
50. A facsimile of the offending leaflet is reproduced in 343 U.S. at 276.
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the Court found group libel tending to cause a breach of the peace,51
these two dissenting Justices saw an exercise of the right to petition
government. 2 The logic which aligns Beauharnais with the Times and
later Garrison3 decisions is belief of those Justices that
[T]he First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth, protects every person from having a state or the fed-
eral government fine, imprison, or assess damages against him
when he has been guilty of no conduct.., other than expressing
an opinion, even though others may believe that his views are
unwholesome, unpatriotic, stupid or dangerous . . . Indeed, "ma-
licious," "seditious," and other such evil-sounding words often
have been invoked to punish people for expressing their views on
public affairs.r
This view is in line with the "general proposition" on expression upon
public questions stated by the Court in its Times opinion.55 Both the
League leaflet and the civil rights committee's advertisement were-
again to use the language of the Times opinion-expressions of "griev-
ance and protest on one of the major public issues of our time." 56 The
defendant newspaper was represented before the Court in Times by
the leading exponent 7 of neutral principles of law. Surely, the Court
might have been expected to overrule Beaubarnais in clearing a path to
its new position in Times.
Ignoring the question of the validity of the Illinois statute upheld in
Beaubarnais, the Court turned its attention instead to that of the con-
51. 343 U.S. at 254.
52. Id. at 274. Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black who also stated, "The Court
,condones this expansive state censorship by painstakingly analogizing it to the law of
criminal libel. As a result of this refined analysis, the Illinois statute emerges labeled
a 'group libel law.' . . . However tagged, the Illinois law is not that criminal libel
which has been 'defined, limited and constitutionally recognized time out of mind'.
For as 'constitutionally recognized' that crime has provided for punishment of false,
malicious, scurrilous charges against individuals, not against huge groups." Id. at 271-272.
53. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
54. Id. at 79-80.
55. 376 U.S. at 269.
56. Id. at 271.
57. H. Vechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REX,. 1 (1959). See Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Beaubarnais: "The same kind of state
law that makes Beauharnais a criminal for advocating segregation in Illinois can be
utilized to send people to jail in other states for advocating equality and nonsegrega-
tion." 343 U.S at 274.
[Vol. 9:126
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stitutionality of the Sedition Act 58 which expired in 1800. In so doing it
chose a course akin to that of the French revolutionaries who in 1793
exhumed from the vaults at Saint Denis and decapitated the bodies of
long-since deceased royalty while permitting their scion, Louis XVII, to
live on though in virtual captivity59
An affinity between the Alabama law as applied in Times and the
Sedition Act of 1798 to 1800 was the Court's crowning analogy.
Under its civil libel law, the Court pointed out, Alabama was able to
penalize good faith critics of government "by transmuting criticism of
government, however impersonal it may seem on its face, into personal
criticism, and hence potential libel of the officials of whom the govern-
ment is composed." 60 Faced with the self-imposed problem of how to
invalidate a statute that was not or never had been before it, the Court
chose to accomplish its aim by affirming the decision of the "court of
history." 61
The Court of History
What the court of history had decided was determined by the Su-
preme Court on the basis of the testimony of a blue ribbon panel of
witnesses made up of four scholars (Levy, Smith, Cooley and Chafee),
four Justices (Holmes, Brandeis, Jackson and Douglas), and three early
statesmen (Jefferson, Madison and Calhoun). Most of the chosen
authorities believed that the Sedition Act of 1798 was contrary to the
First Amendment, but, if the proceedings of the court of history are to
be adversary rather than ex parte, it is only appropriate also to elicit
their views respecting that amendment's effect on state libel law.
In the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions 2 of which they are the
respective authors, Jefferson and Madison vigorously assert the nullity
of the Alien and Sedition Acts. But, as Dean Levy-himself one of the
58. Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 596.
59. See 1 S. BIRo, THE GERMAN POLICY OF REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 184-186 (1957).
The uncrowned Dauphin was apprenticed to a shoemaker and died of mistreatment.
60. 376 U.S. at 292.
61. Id. at 276.
62. For text of The Kentucky Resolutions of November 10, 1798, see S. PAuoVER,
THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 128-134 (1943). For text of the Virginia Resolutions of
December 24, 1798, see VI G. HUNT, WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 326-331 (1906). It
was in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions that Calhoun grounded his doctrine of
nullification or interposition the best known expressions of which are the South Caro-
lina Exposition and Protest of December 19, 1828 and the Fort Hill Address or Letter
of July 26, 1831.
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Court-chosen authorities-points out, "It would be misleading not to rep-
resent their theory of freedom of expression as inextricably part of their
theory of federalism." 63 It is therefore to be expected that, on the issue
of the validity of state libel laws, these witnesses will turn hostile. Read-
ing further into Madison's Report in support of the Virginia Resolutions
-and the Court's opinion contains quotations from both documents-
we find a reference to
the policy of binding the hand of the Federal government, from
touching the channel which alone can give efficacy to its responsi-
bility to its constituents; and of leaving those who administer it, to
a remedy for injured reputation, under the same laws, and in the
same tribunals, which protect their lives, their liberties and their
properties.64
In the Resolutions which he prepared for the Kentucky legislature,
Jefferson asserted that, in adopting the Tenth and First Amendments,
the States
manifested their determination to retain to themselves the right
of judging how far the licentiousness of speech and of the press
may be abridged without lessening their useful freedom, and how
far those abuses which cannot be separated from their use should
be tolerated, rather than the use be destroyed.65
Thus it appears that the argument which the Court builds on selected
texts from the basic literature of interposition is more facade than solid
structure. Professor Kalven has referred to the court of history ap-
63. L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPrSSION 267 (1960).
64. HUNT, supra note 62, at 393. Report of the Committee to whom were referred
the Communications of various States, relative to the Resolutions of the last General
Assembly of this State, concerning the Alien and Sedition Laws.
65. PA ovFR, supra note 63, at 129. Cf. the New Hampshire Resolution (of June 15,
1799) on the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions. This resolution, which pointed the
way to Marbury v. Madison, stated in part:
That the state legislatures are not proper tribunals to determine the con-
stitutionality of the laws of the general government; that the duty of such
decision is properly and exclusively confided to the judicial department.
That, if the legislature of New Hampshire, for mere speculative purposes,
were to express an opinion on the acts of the general government, com-
monly called "the Alien and Sedition Bills," that opinion would unre-
servedly be, that those acts are constitutional, and, in the present critical
situation of our country, highly expedient.
I R. HoFsTADTER, GREAT ISSUES IN AMERICAN POLITICS 185-186 (1956).
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proach as "heady doctrine." 11 It is heady, indeed, to be conducted by
the Warren Court through this Potemkin's Village.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that Jefferson believed that the
.states "fully possessed" the "right to control the freedom of the press," 67
but, it pointed out, "this distinction was eliminated with the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the application to the States of the
First Amendment's restrictions." 68 Fifty-four years after the adoption
of that amendment, Justices Holmes and Brandeis joined the Court in
a declaration that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other
provision of the Constitution of the United States imposes upon the
States any restrictions about 'freedom of speech' . . . nor does it confer
any right of privacy upon either persons or corporations." 69 Later,
in their dissent to Gitlow,70 the two Justices announced a change of
attitude. "The general principle of free speech," they wrote, "must be
taken to be included in the Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope
that has been given to the word 'liberty' as there used, although perhaps
it may be accepted with a somewhat larger latitude of interpretation
than is allowed to Congress by the sweeping language that governs or
ought to govern the laws of the United States." 71 Their new position
was embraced by Mr. Justice Jackson, who along with Justices Holmes,
Brandeis and Douglas72 were singled out and relied upon by the Court in
Times. "What they wrote, with care and circumspection," Jackson
said, "I accept as the wise and historically correct view of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 73 He noted that Holmes and Brandeis had joined the
Court majority in Near v. Minnesota74 in declaring that the State ap-
propriately afforded the defamed public officials of the case "both
public and private redress by its libel laws." 7 In Palko v. Connecticut,76
66. Kalven, supra note 6 at 193.
67. 376 U.S. at 276-277, citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 522, n. 4 (con-
curring opinion).
68. 376 U.S. at 277.
69. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922).
70. Gitow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
71. Id. at 672.
'72. On the page cited by the Court in DouGrAs, THE RIGHr-or THE PEOPLE tO KNow
47 (1958), the author states his agreement with the Holmes dissent in Abrams v.
United States [250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)1 which indicated that the Alien and Sedition
Laws would not pass judicial scrutiny today-thus telegraphing his agreement with the
Court on this issue in Times.
73. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 291 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
74. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
75. Id. at 715.
76. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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the surviving Brandeis was one of a majority of eight who explained
that the Fourteenth Amendment "qualified state power only by such
general restraints as are essential to 'the concept of ordered liberty.' "77
These pronouncements were interpreted by Jackson to mean that
When the Federal Government puts liberty of press in one scale,
it has a very limited duty to personal reputation or local tranquility
to weigh against it in the other. But state action affecting speech
or press can and should be weighed against and reconciled with
these conflicting social interests.78
Mr. Justice Jackson also wrote in this opinion which the Supreme Court
itself offered in evidence to establish what had been decided by the
court of history:
More than forty State Constitutions, while extending broad pro-
tection to speech and press, reserve a responsibility for their abuse
and implicitly or explicitly recognize validity of criminal libel
laws. We are justified in assuming that the men who sponsored the
Fourteenth Amendment in Congress, and those who ratified it in
the State Legislatures, knew of such provisions then in many of
their State Constitutions. Certainly they were not consciously
canceling them or calling them into question, or we would have
some evidence of it. Congresses, during the period while this
Amendment was being considered or was but freshly adopted, ap-
proved Constitutions of "Reconstructed" states that expressly men-
tioned state libel laws, and also approved similar Constitutions for
States erected out of the federal domain.79
77. Id. at 324-325.
78. 343 U.S. at 295. "The inappropriateness of a single standard for restricting State
and Nation, Mr. Justice Jackson further stated, "is indicated by the disparity between
their functions and duties in relation to those freedoms. Criminality of defamation
is predicated upon power either to protect the private right to enjoy integrity of repu-
tation or the public right to tranquillity. Neither of these are objects of federal cog-
nizance except when necessary to the accomplishment of some delegated power, such
as protection of interstate commerce." Id. at 294-295. For examples of cases of this
latter type, see Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114, 383 U.S.
53 (1966), in which the Court limited the availability of state remedies for libel to
prevent interference with the effective administration of national labor policy; and
Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525 (1959),
holding that S 15 of the Federal Communication Act grants a licensee an immunity
from liability for libelous material it broadcasts.
79. 343 U.S. at 292-293.
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In support of its court of history argument, the Supreme Court also
cited four scholarly works80 all but one of which contain more to re-
fute that theory than to support it. Dean Leonard Levy's Legacy of
Suppression is cited by the Court for its description of the Jeffer-
sonians' campaign against the Sedition Act, but that book also carries
Levy's conclusion that the known evidence points strongly in favor of
the proposition that, contrary to Holmes' version of history, the First
Amendment "left the law of seditious libel in force." "I Dean Levy also
explains why he found "unsupportable" 82 the statements in James
M. Smith's Freedom's Fetters that Republican speakers intended their
arguments against seditious libel to be applied "to state governments as
well as the federal government." 83 Views from Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations more relevant than those cited by the Court in Tihes are
summarized by Chief Justice Hughes, joined by Holmes, Brandeis and
other Justices, in support of their belief that the common law rules of
libel were not abolished by the Constitution.8" Chafee's Free Speech in
80. L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 258 et seq. (1960); J. SmITH, FRFEDOM'S FETrERS
426, 431 and passim. (1956); T. COOLEY, CoNsTITnToNAL LIMITATIONS 899-900 (8th ed.,
Carrington, 1927); Z. CIAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNrrED STATES 27-28 (1942).
81. LEVY, supra note 80, at 248.
82. Id. at 265, note 45.
83. SMITH, supra note 80, at 149.
84. Near v. Minnesota, 233 U.S. 697, 715 (1931) relying on Cooley, supra note 80,
at 883, 884. The dissent of Mr. Justice Butler in Near concludes as follows: "The
doctrine that measures such as the one before us are invalid because they operate as
previous restraints to infringe freedom of press exposes the peace and good order of
every community and the business and private affairs of every individual to the
constant and protracted false and malicious assaults of any insolvent publisher who
may have purpose and sufficient capacity to contrive and put into effect a scheme or
program for oppression, blackmail or extortion"' 233 U.S. at 737-738.
After announcing its "actual malice" rule in Tihes, the court added: "An oft-cited
statement of a like rule, which has been adopted by a number of state courts is found
in the Kansas case of Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908)." It then
cites, in a footnote, cases from ten other states that have adopted similar rules and
cites a number of favorable scholarly authorities along with a suggestion that another
rule is to be found in the RESTATEMET OF TORTS § 598, comment a (1938). § 598
reads:
An occasion is conditionally privileged when the circumstances induce a
correct or reasonable belief that
(a) facts exist which affect a sufficiently important public interest, and
(b) the public interest requires the communication of the defamatory mat-
ter to a public officer or private citizen to act if the defamatory matter is
true.
Comment a includes the following:
The rule stated in this section does not afford a privilege to publish false
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the United States left the question of the constitutionality of the Sedition
Act of 1798 "unresolved," 8" and a twenty-three page appendix to
that work entitled "State War and Peace Statutes Affecting Freedom of
Speech" "I indicates that, if what happens in state legislatures is part of
history, the constitutionality of state sedition laws also remained un-
decided by the court of history.
WIDER APPLICATION
The Times rule reflected an increased concern on the part of the
Supreme Court with the conduct of defendants and with the degree
of justifiable public interest in their offending utterances. A declining
stress on the false or defamatory character of such publication may be
noted. Although the primary emphasis often appears to be on the status
or position of plaintiffs, that inquiry is subsidiary and auxiliary to a pre-
ocupation with determining the degree of public interest in the statement
in question. This new emphasis in factor-weighing has been maintained
by the Court since Times in the cases in which it has again decided be-
tween society's interests in free discussion and personal dignity.
The first of such cases87 involved the validity of the conviction of
New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison for impugning the motives
of eight local judges in the following statement:
defamatory statements of fact about public officers or candidates for office.
The last edition of Prosser's TnE LAW OF TORTS to be published before the Times
decision stated that "some three-fourths of the courts which have considered the ques-
tion have held that the privilege of public discussion is limited to opinion, comment or
criticism, and does not extend to any false assertion of fact." W. PRossER, THE LAw
OF TRTs, 621-622 (1955).
See also, Noel, supra note 20, at 896-897; he lists twenty-six states as following the
majority view and nine the minority view.
Regarding the pre-Times majority rule, Dean Pedrick has written, "With upwards of
thirty states aligning themselves on this side of a hard question involving the freedom
of the press this strict liability position cannot be described as unreasonable. The
circumstances that the position has been endorsed by the Restatement of Torts and that it
represents the common law of England and the Commonwealth countries does not
detract from its respectability. W. Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of
Libel: The Modern Revised Translation, 49 CoRNELL L. Q. 581, 583-584 (1964).
85. Chafee, supra note 80, at 28. See comment by Kalven, supra note 6 at 206-207, 193.
86. Chafee, supra note 80, at 574-597. See also Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MAss
CoMMUmcATION, ch. 14 (1947). This chapter, entitled "Treason and Sedition in Peace,"
presents a brief survey of "American Sedition Legislation" both federal and state down
to 1944.
87. Garrison v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
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The judges have now made it eloquently clear where their
sympathies lie in regard to aggressive vice investigations by refus-
ing to authorize use of the DA's funds to pay for the cost of closing
down the Canal Street clip joints ...
This raises interesting questions about the racketeer influences
on our eight vacation-minded judges.88
In reversing Garrison's conviction, the Supreme Court held the Louis-
iana Criminal Defamation Statute 9 to be contrary to the Times rule in
that it covered false statements against public officials if made with ill
will and it directed punishment for true statements made with "actual
malice" defined by the Louisiana courts to mean "hatred, ill will or
enmity or a wanton desire to injure." 90 In declaring that "Truth may
not be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions where discussion
of public affairs is concerned," 91 it struck down the "historic limitation
of the defense of truth in criminal libel to utterances published with
good motives and for justifiable ends." 92 "Under a rule like the Louis-
iana rule," the Court warned, "permitting a finding of malice based on
an intent merely to inflict harm, rather than an intent to inflict harm
through falsehood, 'it becomes a hazardous matter to speak out against a
popular politician, with the result that the dishonest and incompetent
will be shielded."' "3
In Rosenblatt v. Baer94 the Supreme Court returned to the question,
left open in Times, of "how far down into the lower ranks of govern-
ment employees the 'public official' designation would extend." 95 The
plaintiff in that case had been discharged as supervisor of a county-
operated ski resort and recreational area six months before the defendant
wrote in a column in a local newspaper that he was "thunderstruck" to
learn of the "simply fantastic almost unbelievable" difference in cash
income under the new regime at the resort. It was, he added, "doing
literally hundreds of per cent BETTER than last year" ... "What
88. Id. at 66.
89. LA. REv. STAT. Title 14, §§ 48-50 (1950).
90. 379 U.S. at 78.
91. Id. at 74.
92. Id. at 71-72. See note 7 listing jurisdictions where truth was a defense if published
with good motives and for justifiable ends. Id. at 71.
93. Id. at 73, quoting Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49
COLum. L. Rzv. 875, 893 (1949).
94. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
95. 376 U.S. at 283, note 23.
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happened to all the money last year?" he asked, "and every year?" 96 A
judgment awarding the plaintiff $31,500 was reversed by the Supreme
Court and remanded. As the first trial was held before the decision in
Times the presentations were not shaped to the "public official" issue.
The initial determination of the plaintiff's status was to be left to the
trial judge on remand and for his guidance the Court stated:
[T]he "public official" designation applied at the very least to
those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or
appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or con-
trol over the conduct of govermental affairs. 97
The position of a "public official", the Court added, "has such apparent
importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifica-
tions and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the general
public interest in the qualifications and performance of all government
employees . . ." 98
As in Times the matter complained of was, on its face, an impersonal
discussion of the conduct of operations of government. 99 And the
plaintiff may have been, in the Times sense, a public official. 100 If so,
the instructions to the jury were clearly improper in that the jury was
allowed to find that negligent falsehood would defeat the defendant's
privilege. "The test which we laid down in New York Times, the Court
reemphasized, "is not keyed to ordinary care; defeasance of the privilege
is conditioned not on mere negligence, but on reckless disregard for
truth." 101
In Time, Inc. v. Hill,10 2 the Supreme Court next turned its attention
to the case of a private citizen who had won a judgment of $30,000
under the New York state Right of Privacy statutel 3 for a Life article
entitled "True Crime Inspires Tense Play." This story carried pictures
of the plaintiff's former home and gave the impression that the play,
"The Desperate Hours," mirrored Mr. Hill's family's experience of
96. Id. at 78.
97. Id. at 85.
98. Id. at 86.
99. Id. at 80.
100. Id. at 87.
101. Id. at 84.
102. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). For a prompt and detailed appraisal of this case, see Com-
ment, Privacy, Defamation, and the First Amendment: The Implications of Time, Inc.
v. Hill, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 926 (1967).
103. NEw YORK CIVIL RIGHTS LAW §§ 50 51 (McKinney 1948).
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being held hostage by escaped convicts. "But unlike Hill's experience,"
it was pointed out by the Court, "the family of the story suffers violence
at the hands of the convicts; the father and son are beaten and the
daughter subjected to a verbal sexual insult." 104 Finding the opinion
of the Court of Appeals of New York unclear as to whether the trial
court required "proof of knowledge of the falsity or that the article
was prepared with reckless disregard for the truth," "I the Court re-
versed and remanded. 106 Thus the use of the "actual malice" aspect of
the Times ule is ordered in a case which involved neither a public of-
ficial nor the discussion of governmental affairs. The assignment of
such a burden of proof to a private citizen whose misfortune had been
misrepresented by publicity attending the opening of a new play linked
to an actual incident was explained by the Court in this way:
The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of po-
litical expression or comment upon public affairs, essential as those
are to healthy government. One need only pick up any newspaper
or magazine to comprehend the vast range of published matter
which exposes persons to public view, both private citizens and
public officials. Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees
is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of this
exposure is an essential incident of life in a society which places
a primary value on freedom of speech and of press. "Freedom of
discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation,
must embrace all issues about which information is needed or ap-
propriate to enable members of society to cope with the exigencies
of their period." 107 . . . Erroneous statement is no less inevitable
in such case than in the case of comment upon public affairs, and
in both, if innocent or merely negligent," ... it must be protected
if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space'
104. 87 S. Ct. 534, 537 (1967).
105. id. at 541.
106. The Court's opinion states that on remand, "The jury might reasonably con-
clude from this evidence . . . that Life knew or was reckless of the truth in stating
in the article that 'the story re-enacted' the Hill family's experience. On the other
hand, the jury might reasonably predicate a finding of innocent or only negligent mis-
statement on the testimony . . . that the [entertainment editor] thought beyond doubt
that the 'heart and soul' of the play was the Hill incident. Id. at 545.
107. Quotation from Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940). This
wvell-known theme of Dr. Meiklejohn's was reiterated by him in Public Speecb and the
First Amendment, 55 GEo. L. J. 234, 263 (1966): "The interpretation of the first amend-
ment must fall within, and be responsive to, our most difficult and important enterprise-
the self-education of a self-governing public."
1967]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
that they 'need .. .to survive' ..." 108 We create grave risk of
serious impairment of the indispensable service of a free press in a
free society if we saddle the press with the impossible burden of
verifying to a certainty the facts associated in news articles with
a person's name, picture or portrait, particularly as related to a
non-defamatory matter. 109
The cases of Curtis Publishing Company v. Buttsn0 and Associated
Press v. Walker"' were disposed of jointly. In an opinion in which he
spoke also for Justices Clark, Stewart and Fortas-Chief Justice Warren
concurred in the result but not in the opinion-Mr. Justice Harlan stated
that certiorari had been granted in those two cases in order to give the
Court an opportunity "to consider the impact of the New York Times
decision on libel actions instituted by persons who are not public officials
but who are "public figures" and involved in issues in which the pub-
lic has a justified and important interest." 112 Cautioning that these two
cases could not be analogized to prosecutions for seditious libel, Harlan
undertook to consider the factors arising in the particular contexts of
those cases."'
Although the Court found both plaintiffs to be "public figures," Butts'
status as such was due to his position alone while Walker had thrust
himself into the vortex of an important controversy." 4 The jury in
Butts had found that Curds' conduct amounted to a "wanton and reck-
less indifference," while the trial court in Walker found insufficient
evidence to prove more than ordinary negligence on the part of As-
sociated Press.-5 Curtis advertised its Saturday Evening Post editorial
policy to be one of "sophisticated muckraking" while the Associated
Press was engaged in the immediate dissemination of news. Coach Butts
and General Walker were found to have an interest in not being falsely
accused, respectively, of rigging a football game between two state uni-
versities and assuming command of a crowd and leading them in a
108. This quotation from N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963), appears
also in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-272; and in Garrison v. State of
Lousiana, 379 U.S. 64 at 74 (1964); and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 87 S. Ct. 1975,
1988 (1967).
109. 87 S. Ct. at 542-543.
110. 87 S. Ct. 1975 (1967).
111. Ibid.
112. Id. at 1998.
113. Id. at 1991.
114. Id. at 1984, 1987.
115. Id. at 1992.
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charge against federal marshals. Corresponding public interest lay in
being informed about the "conduct of athletic affairs of educational
institutions" and "the events and personalities involved in the Mississippi
riots." 116
In announcing the Court's affirmance of a $430,000 judgment for
Butts and the reversal" 7 of a $500,000 award to Walker, Harlan dis-
closed an alternative to the "rigorous" Times rule:
[A] "public figure" who is not a public official may also recover
damages for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes sub-
stantial danger to reputation apparent, on showing of highly un-
reasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the
standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to
by responsible publishers.118
Mr. Justice Harlan pointed out that, like the Times rule, the new
formulation focuses on the conduct which creates the false publica-
tion and that such must be the principal focus of any regulatory
measure which is intended to be ideologically neutral." 9
In the Butts case for the first time since the decision in New York
Times the "actual malice" requirement failed to show up as a dominant
characteristic in one of Times' progeny.12 Only the Chief Justice and
Justices Brennan and White were guided by that standard. Mr. Justice
Black, in a dissent in which he was joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, stated
that the Butts case illustrated the accuracy of his predictions that the
Times constitutional rule concerning libel "is wholly inadequate to save
the press from being destroyed." 121 He deplored jury-like fact-finding
on the part of the Court as a flat violation of the Seventh Amendment,
22
warned the Court that it "is getting itself in the same quagmire in the
field of libel in which it is now helplessly struggling in the field of ob-
scenity," 123 and he called for an abandonment of the Times rule and for
116. Id. at 1987.
117. Walker was reversed and remanded. The Court stated its conclusion that
Walker should not be entitled to damages from the Associated Press. Id. at 1993-1994.
118. 87 S. Ct. at 1991.
119. Id. at 1990.
120. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, Mr. Justice Harlan referred to "the Times case and its
progeny." 87 S. Ct. 534, 552 (1967).
121. 87 S. Ct. 1975, 1999 (1967).
122. Id. at 2000.
123. Ibid. For an argument that the Times case offers "an admirable model for the
construction of a rule" for the regulation of pornographic materials, see Dirty Words
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the adoption of one "to the effect that the First Amendment was intended
to leave the press free from the harassment of libel judgments." 124
In addition to the "absolutists"-Black, Douglas and Goldberg while
the latter was on the Court-with whom the proponents of the Times
malice test have been faced from the outset, a group is emerging who
believe that that test is being used too extensively. The following refer-
ences to concurrences and dissents in earlier cases further suggest the
manner in which these two positions are being articulated.
In Time, Inc. v. Hill, Justices Black and Douglas concurred in the
Court's opinion stating, as they did in the Walker case, that they did
so "in order for the Court to be able at this time to agree on an opinion
in this important case based on the prevailing doctrine expressed in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan." 125 But in both cases they made it clear
that they were not receding from their position which they had first
taken in Times-i.e., that which they had previously expressed "about
the much wider press and speech freedoms" which the First and Four-
teenth Amendments were designed to grant. 28 In support of their wider
view, Douglas stated that, "A fictionalized treatment of the event is, in
my view, as much in the public domain as would be a water color of the
assassination of a public official." 127 Characterizing judicial balancing
as a "Constitution ignoring and destroying technique", Black admon-
ished that, "If judges have, however, by their own fiat today created a
right of privacy equal to or superior to the right of a free press that the
Constitution created; then tomorrow and the next day and the next,
judges can create more rights that balance away other cherished Bill of
Rights freedoms." 128
To this Black received an answer in the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Fortas joined by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Clark. Fortas
pointed out that the right of privacy which is "the right to be let alone"
was recognized in at least 35 jurisdictions,129 and quoted from opinions in
Ohnstead v. United States,130 Mapp v. Ohio,'1 ' Griswold v. Connecti-
and Dirty Poliics: Cognitive Dissonance in the First Amendment, 34 U. CHI. L. REV.
367 (1967).
124. 87 S. Ct. 1975, 2000 (1967).
125. 87 S. Ct. 534, 547 (1967).
126. Id. at 547.
127. Id. at 549.
128. Id. at 548.
129. Citing W. PRossER, LAW OF ToRTS 831, 832 (1964, 3d ed.).
130. 277 U. S. 438 (1928).
131. 367 U. S. 643 (1961).
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cut132 and other cases to the effect that privacy is "the most comprehen-
sive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men;" '13 that the
right to privacy is "no less important than any other right carefully and
particularly reserved to the people;" 134 and that privacy is a right which
the Court "derived by implication from the specific guarantees of the
Bill of Rights." 135
To these three justices, the reckless'36 assault upon the privacy of a
-quiet family for no purpose except dramatic interest and commercial
appeal was "not within the specially protected core of the First Amend-
ment." 117 To subject Mr. Hill to the burden of a new trial after eleven
years of litigation, they believed, was a drastic action by a remote court 8
deferring to those whose views are absolute as to the scope of the First
Amendment. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting separately, stated his belief
that a jury-finding of ordinary negligence would meet the federal con-
stitutional requirements in a case, such as this, which lay outside "that
area of discussion central to a free society," and that "thus the state
interest in encouraging careful checking and preparation of published
material is far stronger than in Times." 139
To round out these illustrations of views of those within the Court
who feel that the Times "malice test" is either frightening the press into
timidity 140 or encouraging it to recklessness and carelessness 141 the fol-
lowing two statements, by Black and Stewart respectively, are offered:
The "weighing" doctrine plainly encourages and actively invites
judges to choose for themselves between conflicting values, even
where, as in the First Amendment, the Founders made a choice of
values, one of which is a free press.142
1i.2. 381 L. S. 479 (1965).
133. 277 U. S. at 478. (Brandeis dissenting)
134. 367 U. S. at 656.
135. 87 S. Ct. 534, 555 (1967).
136. Id. at 559.
137. Ibid.
138. Id. at 557-58. "But a jury instruction is not abracadabra," Mr. Justice Fortas
wrote. "Only its poorer examples are formalistic codes recited by a trial judge to
please appellate masters. At its best, it is simple, rugged communication from trial judge
to a jury of ordinary people .... Instructions are to be viewed in this common sense
perspective, and not through the remote and distorting knothole of a distant appellate
fence." Ibid.
139. Id. at 549, 552.
140. Id. at 548.
141. Id. at 558.
142. Id. at 548.
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And its counter:
The protection of private personality, like the protection of life
itself, is left primarily to the individual States, under the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments. But this does not mean that the right
is entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a basic of our-
constitutional system.143
CONCLUSION
In a line of decisions beginning with New York Times v. Sullivan,.
the United States Supreme Court for the first time has undertaken to,
impose new tort law upon the states in the areas of defamation and
privacy invasion. These recent cases, which tend to tip the scales in.
favor of defendants, stand for the proposition that in order to recover
in an action for injury to one's reputation, dignity or emotional tran-
quility caused by false statements on a matter of public interest, the-
plaintiff must be able to prove that the defendant uttered the untruths:
knowingly or with less than ordinary care. How much less, the Times:
opinion suggested, depends on how close the matter is to "the very
center of the constitutionally protected area of free speech", 44 and made-
clear that "impersonal attack on governmental operations" 145 stands at
this epicenter. But beyond this, by placing a greater burden of proof on"
non-hermit Hill than on "public figures" Butts and Walker, the court
has thrown into question the relevance of such factors as the prominence
of the plaintiff and public interest in the subject matter. The large
award to Butts and the possibility of success by Baer and Hill on remand,.
show-to return to the metaphor of the introduction-that the calls by
Justices Black and Douglas for total victory have not been heeded and
the modification of the Times rule in the Butts and Walker cases may
indicate some de-escalation on the Second Front.
143. 383 U. S. 75, 92 (1966).
144. 376 U. S. at 292 (1964).
145. Ibid.
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